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2. Intelligence
What are the problems which face voluntary agencies who wish to help after 
a disaster? They would appear to fall into two main categories: getting to know 
what has happened, and deciding what can be done about it. Finding out what has 
happened can prove to be difficult for a number of reasons. Floods, cyclones, 
hurricanes and earthquakes can affect a very large area in a very short time. 
Delineating the extent of the area stricken and the degree to which different 
groups of people within that area are affected, must be the immediate priority 
of any would-be helper. Communications in the area, probably unreliable at the 
best of times, are usually disrupted beyond use. Getting into an area to find 
out what has happened may not be so easy either. Floods demand boats and/or air 
transport where there was none before; earthquakes often occur in mountainous 
regions where roads are easily disrupted and in terrain where flying can be ex­
ceedingly dangerous. Even when one manages to gather some information, the 
problem arises of knowing (1) how reliable it is, for exaggeration and rumour 
are inevitably endemic at such times, and (2) how representative the information 
is. Information coming out of an area from untrained observers may be qualita­
tively descriptive painting the picture as it is (or at least as it was when 
the observer saw it) but it is unlikely to be quantitatively descriptive or 
accurate. Further, unless the observer is familiar with normality in the area, 
then he is liable to assume that what to him is unusual, is in fact the result of 
the disaster.
3. Field Communications
The needs in such a situation then, are:
(1) Rapid means of access to the disaster area.
(2) A sufficient number of observers who (a) are familiar with the area;
(b) speak the language, and (c) know what they are looking for.
(3) A rapid means of communicating such information back to a central 
information centre before it becomes outdated and useless.
(4) A means of standardising such reports such that they are capable of 
comparison.
(5) A means of assembling such reports such that (a) a graphic picture 
of the total situation may be produced, and (b) the situation in any 
one locality can be immediately known.
In the recent large scale disasters, the representatives of most aid giving 
agencies have had to undertake such fact-finding work themselves. Each repre­
sentative has arrived and organised as best he could, his own tour of the affected 
area, or rather, those parts of it which the availability of transport allowed 
and which he hoped no-one else had covered. The representatives have, in an 
informal way, exchanged such information as they were able to gather, but as no 
one body has been centrally responsible for collecting and distributing informa­
tion, then the impressions collected by individual organisations have been at 
best, partial and arbitrary, and at worst misleading.
4. International Communications
The next problem faced by such representatives has been that of communicating 
their reports and recommendations back to their parent organisations. At a time 
when the world’s eyes are focussed on the unfortunate country, the normal channels 
of communication, none too good at the best of times, are usually overloaded —  
carrying press communiques and private messages enquiring after and giving news 
of relatives. It may take two days for a cable to reach Geneva from the field 
and a further two days for a reply to be sent back. Four days delay with an 
affected population of several hundred thousand waiting for aid is, by modern 
technical standards, to say the least, unnecessary. There is evidently a need 
for the provision of a reliable and expertly manned communications unit which 
could be rapidly installed in the principal town of the affected area or in the 
administrative capital of the country, as convenient.
9. A Disaster Services Group
After briefly ranging over a confusing variety of social, organisational 
and technical problems, I would like to conclude with a fairly limited suggestion 
for the establishment of a mobile disaster information unit. Bearing in mind the 
likely complexities of organising any disaster service on an international basis 
and the fairly limited resources available to voluntary agencies, then any plan 
for co-ordination must, at least in the initial stages, be simple, inexpensive
and answer a felt need. In my experience the principal practical problem to be 
faced by the international voluntary agencies after a natural disaster is the 
one described in the early paragraphs of this paper: that of obtaining reliable 
information and co-ordinating activities (a) with each other, and (b) with the 
indigenous government.
For a fairly modest investment in staff and equipment, it should be possible 
to establish a small disaster services group (of say not more than twelve persons) 
who would be available to travel to any part of the world at a moment’s notice 
and who would provide the communications centre around which international, govern 
mental and voluntary agencies could, with reliable and immediate information, plan 
their activities. Such a system would have the additional advantage that all 
agencies would need to report their observations and activities to the centre in 
order to stay in the picture themselves. Without in any way imposing a system 
on other organisations or on the resident government authorities, such a com­
munications and information centre would automatically become a co-ordinating unit 
in practice, if not in name. For a more detailed account of the equipment needed 
to provide such a service, refer to Appendix I and II.
Technical Appendix I
Outline of Equipment Necessary for the Establishment of Radio 
Contact Between Survey and Aid Personnel 
in the Field and the Local Capital:
For such a purpose, equipment would have to be capable of transmitting and 
receiving over distances in the order of two to several hundred miles. All equip­
ment should be to military specification, that is: of sound construction, suitable 
for use in all geographical and climatic conditions (including tropical conditions 
with high temperature and humidity); be waterproof and resistant to vibration and 
shock; be simple in operation; be powered by rechargeable batteries and be capable 
of being carried as a manpack unit or fitted to a vehicle or boat as necessary.
The unit should also be capable of being set up and operated by a comparatively 
unskilled operator.
A set suitable for the work envisaged would have the following features. It 
should be a single side bank transmitter-receiver for telephony, completely trans­
istorised, cover 2 MHz to 12 MHz in 1kHz steps by frequency synthesis giving 9,999 
channel frequencies. It should be operated from a rechargeable 12V battery to 
give a 15W p.e.p. output through a whip or dipole aerial, and be capable of use in 
conjunction with a 100W p.e.p. linear amplifier.
It is probably impossible to be precise about the number of sets which would 
be required to provide a flexible communications network under all conditions and 
in all terrains where natural disasters are liable to occur. In some senses the 
more sets available the better. To enable a rapid initial survey of affected 
areas to be made, and to communicate such information back to a central office 
would, in the most recent of disasters, probably have necessitated the use of 
some twelve sets. However, without doubt, the principal limitation would be the 
cost of such apparatus. A complete unit (including 100 Watt amplifier) costs in 
the region of two thousand eight hundred pounds sterling (£2,800 - approx.
U.S.$6,800). Such apparatus is likely to be beyond the means of individual 
voluntary aid giving agencies. A consortium of agencies however, might be prepared 
to consider investing the necessary resources.
Technical Appendix II
Outline of Equipment Necessary for the Establishment of Radio 
Teleprinter Link Between the Local Capital of 
the Affected Country and Geneva or New York
It is to be stressed from the outset that such equipment will certainly be 
beyond the means of the voluntary aid giving agencies, as the equipment described 
is valued in the order of ten thousand pounds sterling (£10,000, approx. U.S. 
$24,300) and a lesser sum for the unit located in Geneva or New York. Such infor­
mation is included only in the hope that the voluntary agencies might be better 
in a position to pressure the appropriate bodies to earmark for disaster situations 
such equipment and skilled operators as already exist for military purposes. An 
alternative approach might be to attempt to interest the international press in 
a jointly sponsored communications venture. There are common problems to be faced 
by both international voluntary aid agencies and the world’s media services. The 
latter might be more easily persuaded of the advantages in investing the necessary 
funds.
A mobile transmitting-receiving station for the field capital would consist 
of the following components. A high power transmitter of 1 K Watt, comprising a 
synthesised and tunable receiver, a synthesised 1 K Watt drive unit, a 1 K Watt 
amplifier and a directional aerial. In addition, a teleprinter would be coupled 
to the simple transmitting-receiving unit and the whole would be housed in a 
mobile cabin which could be loaded complete and transported by air to its destina­
tion at a moment’s notice. The cabin would be air-conditioned by its own A.C. 
unit and two generating sets (one operational and one standby) would also be 
required to power the unit.
With modifications, such a unit could be geared to maintaining communications 
links with Geneva or New York, or any part of the world, whilst simultaneously 
monitoring radio reports from the field. Such a unit would become the centre of 
the communicational aspects of the operation, and could easily be linked either 
physically or by land line to centre of administrative operations.
